tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post3893937479857002895..comments2023-10-17T05:07:52.056-05:00Comments on Thunder Tales: Blue Angels ReportEd Rasimushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13667325554289268659noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post-75436510229783549812011-06-02T11:24:33.013-05:002011-06-02T11:24:33.013-05:00The "Diamond Crash"
As Ed knows, I did s...The "Diamond Crash"<br />As Ed knows, I did some tests in the Talon on slab stall and it is indeed true that through the float under 150kts inverted you can input pitch to the slab tail on the 38 that can result in a change in positive nose rate. This could or might not have been a factor for TB1 as Lowery took the team through the float at Indian Springs.<br />Unfortunately the "investigation" thanks to the Creech bounce, left more questions than answers. I know Patterakis wasn't at all convinced that Lowery had a slab actuator issue I share Chris' view.<br />Al King's tape of the crash impact has never been found to my knowledge after it's acquisition by TAC. <br />My opinion leans heavily, based on what I know personally about the scenario involved with the line abreast loop that day is that Lowery, a fine fighter pilot and a smooth lead, very well might have simply missed his high energy gate parameters and took the team through the high gate too low and very possibly too fast. That combination jives perfectly with testimony that the backside formation looked fast and normal. It also computes to a higher TAS and wider turn radius through the backside recovery.<br />It's also felt by many that had the formation been in the Diamond and not line abreast, there could have been a "go exploded call" based on the visual cues available to the wings and especially the slot, (yes, good display formation pilots actually CAN take a peek in the diamond display formation based on where in the maneuver they are and their experience in the position) Line abreast is a whole different story as far as visual cues vs painting your position is concerned. You're REALLY trusting lead in line abreast.<br />The Thunderbird Diamond Crash will always be the subject of much controversy in the display community. My personal opinion is that the final answers died with Bill Creech.<br />Dudley HenriquesDudley Henriqueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05583662412985036803noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post-11897384715879361502011-06-01T13:07:39.455-05:002011-06-01T13:07:39.455-05:00I was stationed at HQ/TAC when this accident happe...I was stationed at HQ/TAC when this accident happened. The word on the street was that GEN Creech directed the accident board to find something wrong with the lead airplane because he feared that a "pilot error" finding would spell at the end of the T'Birds.Hipponoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post-44737893655925305952011-05-29T09:58:34.016-05:002011-05-29T09:58:34.016-05:00Juvat,
The accident board initially called "...Juvat, <br /><br />The accident board initially called "pilot error" then Gen Creech called them back and explained that "Thunderbirds don't make pilot errors, find something else". They reconvened and wrote it up as a malfunction of the "shock absorber" in the pitch control system. <br /><br />We had 160 AT-38s at Holloman at that time. Okie Page was pilot officer on the board and Ron Somebody-or-other was board president. We also had the maintenance member of the board (it was a TAC accident and we were the greatest pool of Talon operators in TAC). <br /><br />Nobody could really find a single reference to a "shock absorber" in the slab control system but they were all "inspected" and cleared for flight. No pictures or descriptions in the -1 or maintenance manuals either. <br /><br />Recall that trim was handled by stick positioning, not moving the control surfaces. The stick was adjusted to command the desired trim positions. Control feel never changed and max stick force never exceeded five pounds total for full displacement. <br /><br />I did encounter (regularly) something I called a slab stall on the Talon. If you commanded too much slab at low airspeed you could actually get it to exceed critical AOA and somehow never get any bite as airspeed built so that your nose didn't want to move. A simple release of pressure momentarily would re-establish control and responsiveness. Worked just like any stall recovery.Ed Rasimushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13667325554289268659noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post-58069819481290442942011-05-29T09:47:32.405-05:002011-05-29T09:47:32.405-05:00I thought the Thunderbird accident was found to ha...I thought the Thunderbird accident was found to have been a flight control malfunction, trim motor or something like that.juvathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09096708575138552532noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10438070.post-5809988565418691042011-05-29T09:43:37.843-05:002011-05-29T09:43:37.843-05:00Looks like the leader flew down to the base height...Looks like the leader flew down to the base height rather than misjudged the pull-out. They all looked comfortable on the way down.chris parkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15448068468548232114noreply@blogger.com