A couple of readers have noted in comments their very close linkage to the PATCO strike. I feel compelled to offer my perspective.
I was at Holloman AFB outside Alamogordo NM flying the AT-38 at the time. There were four Talon squadrons and a sister wing of three F-15 Eagle squadrons at the base. The -38s were engaged in Fighter Lead-In Training for brand new pilot training graduates enroute to their first "real" fighter assignment. We taught tactical formations, offensive and defensive air-to-air, ground-attack bomb/rocket/strafe, and low-level navigation. My squadron also did the training for newly assigned instructors and basic orientation for students going to Forward Air Controller assignments that needed to know what it looked like from the fighter point-of-view. The Talons alone were flying 160 sorties a day.
PATCO walked off the job and we suspended operations. But, the calendar doesn't stand still and we had graduation dates to meet. We held some meetings to discuss options. The language of the USAF basic flying regulation was very specific, "flights will be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules to the maximum extent practicable."
IFR flying meant dependence on FAA controllers for departure and return from our training areas. No air traffic controllers, no IFR. But, IFR had no longer become "practicable."
Once in our airspace blocks we maintained our own separation. It was only a problem going to and from the areas. The answer was obvious. Fly under Visual Flight Rules. Look out the front window!
We were grounded for about a day and a half before the Fighter Pilots convinced the Hq princes that it was safe and operationally a common practice. We had a military tower and a military approach control which were still on the job, but as long as the sun was shining in New Mexico we didn't need no steenkin' PATCO.
Later I would listen quietly while FAA folks would expound on the importance of their guidance in telling those stupid pilots where to go. Then I would nod and simply remind myself that the only reason they could do that was because we let them...and we could stop anytime we wanted.
1 comment:
I remember a Red Flag deployment in 1980 or thereabouts.
Our strike package was worried about the threat of Red Air (the bad guys) and was having a skull session looking for a solution as we had limited numbers of bombers and limited gas.
We had a USAF Air Traffic Control guy there as a liasion. As we were discussing the difficulties involved with the pre-strike bombing of red air's airfields, our ATC guy piped up and said it was simple- it would only take 1 fighter. Just strafe the red airfield tower. That way, there'd be nobody to tell the bad guys how to get airborne and VoilĂ !! no red air threat.
It took a while to stop laughing and get back to business.
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