Loss of Leverage

I mentioned two days ago that I was, during one period of my career, on nuclear alert to attack Tbilisi in Georgia. At that time, it was a Soviet Socialist Republic and our posture was one of being prepared for all-out nuclear war. It seems long ago now, but it really wasn’t in the scope of the nuclear age. During the ’60, ‘70s and into the early ‘80s the tactical air force was as much involved in nuclear alert as the more publicized strategic bombers, ICBMs and nuclear submarines. There were fighter aircraft in hardened shelters throughout Europe and along the Pacific rim loaded with thermonuclear weapons and poised to launch against pre-planned targets.

This was a very complex and detailed plan that offered a wide range of options. From the daily alert posture it could be enhanced by the addition of more weapon-loaded systems and then enhanced again with forward deployment of more assets until it was many times the size of the standing start force. Mutually Assured Destruction meant that there were many more weapons than there were targets and you could tell where you were in the big picture by looking at the hyphenated suffix number on your target folder. If the last digit was “dash 4” that meant you were going to be the fourth weapon to strike that unfortunate location. Scary stuff to say the least.

Those days ended prematurely for my Georgian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Crimean targets when the nation that hosted our base went to war with a neighbor and we worried that our nuclear presence might create problems. Our alert operations were suspended and never resumed. Less than a decade later, almost the entire European tactical nuclear alert was suspended. SALT, START and nuclear non-proliferation agreements caused deactivation of a lot of nuclear systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact furthered the reduction.

But, take the current situation between Russia and Georgia into consideration. We aren’t happy with Russia’s actions. We have supported the democratization of Georgia. Georgia even wants to become a member of NATO. Russia, of course wants to reassert their military prominence which has been pretty well discredited since their Afghanistan debacle. (Note to Sen. Obama: read up on that and reconsider your war on terror plan.)

What leverage do we have today with our military heavily involved on two fronts in the war on terror that can be applied to compel Russia to accede to our wishes? We can complain to Putin’s puppet who sits in the chair of the Russian presidency. We can make a speech at the UN. We can threaten sanctions, but we have too much interest in Russian economic development and concurrent stability to really do anything. We can appeal to their humanity. Or we can wail and gnash our teeth. Maybe like policy wonkette Obama, we can urge “restraint by both parties.” Great solution to the problem, Barak!

Wouldn’t it be nice if we still had those jets with a big hammer sitting on alert? They certainly require that a potential aggressor take notice. If you then ask for reasonable behavior of Russia you are speaking from a position which possesses both carrot and stick. They know we wouldn’t use them, but can they really be sure?

The leverage offered by deployed nuclear weapons was considerable. The options for employment were very diverse. The simple fact of their existence meant that a potential adversary couldn’t just look at a map, count your deployed divisions, carriers and air wings then act with impunity.

Right now there is talking about enhancing Georgian defenses, maybe with air defense missiles or something like that. The problem is that the threat of the Russians isn’t from the air. It wasn’t during WW-Cold in the Fulda Gap and it isn’t in South Ossetia. It is armor. Tanks, personnel carriers, artillery, and boots on the ground rolling down the highway don’t much care about Patriot missiles. All deployment of advanced techno-weapons would do is Fedex them into Russian exploitation labs. It takes either a lot of bloody manpower to stop the horde, or one man in one airplane with the threat of one really nasty weapon. Quite economical, don’t you think?

We’ve lost that leverage. One could reasonably argue that the world is a much safer place because of that disarmament. But, one could also examine the current situation and make a good case for the reverse. Certainly we would be listened to a lot more seriously by Putin.